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Abstract
Knowledge management has  emerged  as  a  major
industrial  focus  and  has  obvious  pragmatic
interpretations  in  terms of  enterprise  and workflow
modeling.  However, a  principled  approach  to  the
management  of  the  knowledge  processes  of
organizations  combining people  and technologies
requires  an operational definition  of knowledge. This
article  develops a  knowledge  level  analysis  of  the
emergence  of  the  knowledge  construct  through
modeling and management  processes  in  societies  of
adaptive  agents.  The analysis  shows how knowledge
becomes ascribed  to  agents,  organizations  and
technologies,  and how formal logics  of  knowledge,
organizations  and technologies emerge  naturally  from
reasonable presuppositions in the modeling  process.
1 Introduction
The  objective of the research described in this  paper is  to
derive  fundamental principles  for  knowledge  management
by defining knowledge  in operational terms and using this
definition  to  analyze  the  knowledge  dynamics  of
organizations composed  of agents and technologies.
First,  Newell’s knowledge  level  studies  are recapitulated
to show  that  knowledge  can be treated  as a state  variable
imputed to  an  agent  by a  modeler to  account  for  its
behavior.
Second, his  rational  teleological  model is  shown to
involve few fundamental  presuppositions about the  nature
of  the systems involved, except that  they persist  in time
and the  observer  hypothesizes  that  they  actively  bring
about  this state of affairs.
Third,  it  is  shown  that  the  colloquial  interpretation  of
knowledge  as  something material  possessed  by an agent
arises naturally in accounting  for the capabilities of agents
to perform  tasks.
Fourth, it  is  shown  that  further  constraints  on knowledge
level  modeling  arise  from  the  hypothesis  of
compositionality in the derivation of the capabilities  of a
team from its  component  agents.  Furthermore, this  give
rise  to knowledge  modeling  of  organizational  knowledge,
including that  of supporting technologies.
Fifth,  it  is  shown  that  further  constraints  on knowledge
level  modeling  arise  from the  hypothesis that  an agent’s
learning  can be  managed through  the  regulation  of  a
graded  sequence  of tasks that  it  is given to perform.
In  conclusion,  it  is  suggested  that  a  knowledge level
analysis  of  agents,  organizations  and  technologies
provides  appropriate  formal foundations  for  knowledge
management.
2  The Knowledge  Level
In  his  seminal  paper  on the  knowledge  level  Newell
(1982)  situates  knowledge  in  the  epistemological
processes of  an observer attempting to model  the  behavior
of another agent:
"The observer treats  the agent as a system at the
knowledge level,  i.e.  ascribes  knowledge and
goals to it."  (p.106)
emphasizing  that:
"The knowledge level  permits  predicting  and
understanding  behavior  without  having  an
operational  model of  the  processing  that  is
actually  being done by the agent." (p.108)
He defines  knowledge  as:
"Whatever  can be ascribed to  an agent such that
its  behavior can be  computed  according to  the
principle of rationality." (p. 105)
noting  that:
"Knowledge  is  that  which makes the  principle  of
rationality  work  as a law of behavior." (p. 125)
and defining rationality  in terms of the principle that:
"If  an agent  has  knowledge that  one of  its
actions  will  lead to  one of  its  goals,  then  the
agent will select that action." (p. 102)
Newell’s argument form is  a  cybernetic  one of  the  type
originated  by Wiener (1948) and refined  by Ashby  (1956)
whereby  an arbitrary  system  is  treated  as a black box to be
modeled  on the  basis of  its  input/output  behavior with no
presuppositions about its  internal  structure.  Ashby  (1952)
used  this  argument form to  derive  many phenomena of
living  systems,  such  as  habituation,  from  general
properties,  such as  the  existence  of  many  alternative
attractors  in the state  system. Zadeh  (1964) developed  the
abstract  formulation  of  system identification  from a
cybernetic stance,  showing  how  the notion of  state  is  an
abstraction  introduced in modeling  formalisms to account
for the influence of past experience  on future behavior.
Gaines (1977)  developed  general  algorithms  for  such
identification  in  terms of  arbitrary  measures of  model
complexity  and  of  the  approximation  of  a  model to
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led  to  optimal  identification  of  deterministic  and
stochastic  automata from their  behavior.  He emphasizes
the formal arbitrariness  of the presuppositions underlying
a  modeling  schema,  and  shows  that  inappropriate
presuppositions  lead  to  indefinitely  complex models
(Gaines, 1976).
In the light  of these analyses,  Newell’s arguments  may  be
seen as stating  that  knowledge  is  a state  variable  imputed
by a modeler  in order to account for its  behavior, and that
the appropriate presuppositions for  modeling  an agent are
those of rational  teleology,  that  it  has goals and acts to
achieve  them.  Two  fundamental  questions  arise  about
Newell’s  framework  for  knowledge,  one  reaching
backwards to  the  justification  of  modeling behavior
teleologically  in  terms  of  goals  and their  rational
achievement,  and  the  other  reaching  forwards  to  the
nature of the knowledge  state  space that  an observer will
generate,  its  detailed  qualitative  and quantitative
characteristics.
The next section  briefly  examines the  preconditions  for
rational  teleological  models to  be  effective,  and the
remainder  of the  paper develops in depth the structure  of
knowledge  models  that  will arise  in a society of agents.
2 Emergence  of  Rational Teleological  Models
One way of  analyzing  the  foundations  of  rational
teleological  models is  to  assume that  they have none--
that  the  modeling of other  agents in  terms of  goals and
knowledge  is  justified  to  the  extent  that  it  works--a
pragmatic argument of  the  form developed by Peirce  and
James (Ayer, 1968). This assumption  is  that  of  Dennett’s
(1987) intentional  stance, and it  is  in accordance  with the
basic theory of  modeling, the Popperian position  that  our
presuppositions in modeling  are but conjectures subject to
refutation if  we  are not satisfied  with the results  of using
them  (Popper, 1963). Modeling  theory tells  us that  if  the
intentional  stance was not appropriate to  modeling  human
agents  then  it  would lead  to  complex models with poor
predictive  power and we would find  it  more useful  to
adopt some  other stance.
However,  it  is  useful  to  examine some simple systemic
characteristics  of  agents that  would justify  the  use of
rational  teleological  models  if  only to illustrate  how  few
presuppositions are  necessary for  the model to be useful
(Gaines,  1994).  The most fundamental properties  which
we  impute  to  any system are its  existence and persistence
over time.  A system is  identifiable  as not having existed
before some  time,  of definitely  existing  after  some  later
time, of persisting  in existence until  some  later  time, and
of not existing  again after  some  later  time.  This coming
into  existence,  persisting  for  while,  and going out of
existence  again is  a  common  property of  all  systems.  It
applies  to  both living  and non-living  systems,  and in
living systems  it  applies at all  levels from  cell  to species.
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What characterizes  living  systems  are  the  recursive
activities  of self-replication  underlying  their  persistence,
that they actively and continually create the conditions for
their  persistence.  Maturana  (1975) has proposed  that  this
is  the  fundamental distinction  between living  and non-
living  systems. Autopoietic systems:
"are  systems  that  are  defined  as  unities  as
networks of  production  of  components that  (1)
recursively,  through  their  interactions,  generate
and realize  the  network that  produces them; and
(2) constitute in the space  in which  they exist,  the
boundaries of  this  network as components that
participate  in the realization  of the network...a
living  system is  an autopoietic system in physical
space."  (Maturana, 1981)
However, there  is  no notion  of  goals  or  knowledge in
Maturana’s  definition,  and no ascription  of intentions  to
living  systems. A reactive  persistent  system in itself  has
no goals or intentions.  It  reacts  to its  environment  through
mechanisms  that  tend to  maintain its  persistence  despite
changes in  its  environment.  An external  observer  may
model this  behavior  as  goal-directed  because  that
provides a  simple predictive  explanation.  That is,  if  an
autopoietic  system when  disturbed,  regardless  of  what
state  it  is  triggered into,  seems  to return to its  original
state,  it  is  naturally  modeled as  goal-seeking.  If  the
system’s environment happens to  contain  other  systems
like itself  and the system’s activities  include observation
and modeling,  it  may model the  other  systems as  goal-
directed,  and then  by analogy come  to  model itself  as
goal-directed.  This is  a natural outcome  of autopoiesis in
a social  environment.
As  well  as  not  reading  too  much into  models  of
autopoietic  systems, it  is  important to note that  we can
ascribe  very little  to their  existence.  A chaotic universe
has  a  probability  of  producing  any  system including
autopoietic  systems.  Once such systems  exist  and are
modeled properties  emerge (Sharif,  1978).  As Peirce
remarks:
"Law  begets  law;  and  chance  begets
chance...the  first  germ of  law was an entity
which  itself  arose by chance, that is  as a First."
(Peirce,  1898)
Jantsch  (1980)  and  Prigogine  (1984)  have developed
detailed  models of  how  organization  emerges from chaos.
Gould (1989) has analyzed the  fossil  record and modeled
the genesis and extinction  of a wide variety of  species as
low probability  random  events.  Monod  (1972) has given 
biochemical  model of  life  as  an improbable phenomena
that,  once it  exists,  follows deterministic  laws. When  a
living  system  comes  into existence it  acts to persist,  but,
from the  systemic perspective advanced  by Maturana, this
is  the  definitional  property  by which we recognize its
existence  as  a living  system, not an additional  property
going beyond  active persistence.Barrow and Tipler  (1986) have analyzed the  remarkably
narrow physical  conditions  under which life  as  we know
it  can exist,  and when  one examines the  mechanisms  by
which a living  organism narrows these  conditions  even
further in order to persist it  is natural to ascribe purpose  to
its  activity.  For example, Cannon (1932),  terms  such
activity  homeostasis and part  of The Wisdom  of  the  Body
and Ashby  (1952) in  analyzing homeostasis as  part  of his
Design for  a Brain models  it  as a  goal-directed  process.
However,  he  also  shows  how such  apparently  goal-
directed  behavior arises  in any system with many  states  of
equilibrium.  The utility  of  an intentional  stance stems
from simple systemic considerations,  and one has to  be
careful in reifying the notion of agency  to realize that  the
additional  assumption of  the  existence  of  some reified
’agent’ is also a matter of utility,  not of existential  proof
or necessity.
In  Ashby’s day a  system that  reacted  to  its  environment
by acting  until  it  arrived  in  a  new  mode  of  equilibrium
would  be seen as not only counter-acting the effects  of the
environment but  also  arriving  at  some state  that  was
determined  by those effects,  that  is,  apparently targeted
upon them. Nowadays,  with the  realization  that  strange
attractors  are  prevalent  in  all  forms of  physical system
(Ruelle,  1989), and particularly  in  biological  processes
and their  higher-order  manifestations  such  as  brains
(Basar,  1990~  societies  (Dendrinos and Sonis, 1990) 
cultural  phenomena  (Hayles,  1991), it  would  be realized
that  the final  state  may  be one of very many  that  have the
equilibrating  effect  but  is  neither  determined by the
effects  of the environment  nor targeted  upon  them.
In particular,  the  definition  of  fitness  of a  species in
evolutionary terms is  merely a restatement of the species’
persistence  in  terms  of  the  environment  in  which it
persists.  As Ollason  argues:
"Biologists  use  the  concept of  fitness  as the
explanation  of  the  truly  inexplicable.  The
process  of  evolution  is  exactly  what  the
etymology  of the word  implies: it  is  an unfolding,
an indeterminate, and in principle,  inexplicable
unfolding. (Ollason, 1991)
A species  is  fit  to  exist  in  an environment  in  which it
happens to  persist.  As noted in  the  previous paragraph,
this  does not mean  it  was targeted  on that  environment  or
that  there is  a determinate relation  between  the nature of
the  environment and the  species  that  happens to  have
evolved. The environment  acts  as  a filter  of  species and
those  that  persist  are  fit  to  survive.  There  are  no
teleological  implications,  and this  model does not give
’survival-directed’  behavior any greater  probability  of
leading  to  persistence  than  any other  behavior.  Gould
(1989)  details  the  random phenomena that  have  made
particular  species fit  to persist  for a while in the fossil
record.  Bickerton (1990) argues that  there  is  no evidence
for  what we deem  to  be high-level  human  traits  to  have
survival value--intelligence  and language  have at  least  as
many  disadvantages  as advantages,  and may  be seen as  of
negative value to the survival of the human  species.
2.1  Emergence in  Knowledge Management
This conceptual  framework, emphasizing opportunistic
rather  than  goal-directed  behavior,  is  already  a  major
component  of  the  knowledge  management  literature.  One
of  Bridges’  recommendations  in  Managing  Transitions  is
to  Let Go  of  Outcomes:
"we cannot  ultimately  control  outcomes,  and
when  we try  to,  we either alienate others or drive
ourselves crazy."  (Bridges, 1991)
Johansson  and Nonaka  use related  criteria  to differentiate
Western and Japanese  companies in  their  approach  to
marketing:
"Whereas  strategic  planning  in  the  West
typically  cascades down  in  logical  steps  from
broad  mission  statements  to  more specific
objectives  to  the  enumeration  of  tasks,  the
assignment  of responsibilities  and the fixing  of a
time schedule, the  Japanese  approach  is  fuzzier.
The intuitive  incrementalism  of  the  Japanese
means  essentially  experience-based learning,  a
natural  or ’organic’  process."  (Johansson and
Nonaka, 1996)
Barabba’s (1995) introductory  chapter  in  Meeting of  the
Minds is  entitled  The Late  Great  Age of  Command  and
Control and critiques  the  normative approach to business
based on predefined  objectives  rather  than  an adaptive
one  based  on  learning  from  the  market  place,  the
organization’s natural  environment.
There is  an  interesting  parallel  on this  emphasis on
openness to  experience  in  Gadamer’s  discussion  of  what
it  is to be an expert:
"The nature of  experience is  conceived in  terms
of  that which goes beyond  it;  for experience can
never be science. It  is  in absolute antithesis  to
knowledge and to  that  kind  of  instruction  that
follows  from general or theoretical  knowledge.
The truth  of  experience  always  contains  an
orientation  towards new experience.  That is  why
a person who  is  called  ’expert’  has become  such
not only through  experiences, but is  also open to
new  experiences.  The  perfection  of  his
experience,  the  perfect  form of  what we call
’expert’,  does  not  consist  in  the  fact  that
someone already  knows everything  and knows
better  than  anyone else.  Rather,  the  expert
person proves to  be,  on the  contrary,  someone
who is  radically  undogmatic; who, because of
the  many experiences  he  has  had  and  the
knowledge he draws from them is  particularly
equipped  to  have new experiences  and learn
from them."  (Gadamer, 1972)
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cited  above  as stating  that  an ’expert organization’ is  one
that  satisfies  Gadamer’s  notion of  what it  is  to  be an
expert  person.  However,  it  is  important to note  that  he
contrasts  knowledge and expertise.  While a  rational
teleological  model may naturally  emerge when  modeling
a persistent  agent as actively  involved in  ensuring its
persistence,  the  knowledge  imputed  is  a by-product of the
modeling process  not  the  cause  of  the  persistence.
Modeling the  openness  and  adaptivity  of  expertise
involves multiple levels  of  modeling,  and the observer has
to  introduce  notions  of  ’meta-knowledge’  or  ’deep
knowledge’  in  order to  account for  the processes whereby
the  knowledge  imputed  to  account for  specific  short-term
behavior changes through experience.
2.2  Summary  and Implications
In  conclusion,  in  adopting an intentional  stance  one is
selecting  a  modeling  schema  for  its  simplicity,
convenience  and utility.  Newell’s notions of rationality,
goals and knowledge  have no epistemological  content  and
are circularly  derivable from one another as definitions  of
what it  is  to adopt an intentional  stance.  The knowledge
level can be reified  only through our first  being satisfied
that  it  has predictive  capabilities,  and then through our
further  presupposing  that  there  must  be  some real
phenomenon  out there that  makes  that  prediction possible.
We  have to  be  very  careful  in  testing  both  of  these
conditions:  the reflexivity  of  social  interactions  means
that  changes in  our behavior based on assumptions about
another’s  intentions  may  lead  to contingent  behavior on
the part of the other (Levis, 1977) giving rise  to apparent
predictive  validity;  and the  predictive  capabilities  of  a
cybernetic  model  of  a  black  box  place  very  few
constraints  on what structure  actually  exists  within the
box.
We  also  have to  distinguish  those  aspects  of an agent’s
behavior  that  an observer  is  attempting  to  model.  For
example,  modeling  the agent’s current skills,  it  capability
to use those skills  in specific  contexts such as in a team,
and its  capabilities to learn to improve  its  skills,  are three
different  modeling requirements  that  place  different
constraints  on knowledge  level  modeling. The following
three  sections  investigates  each of these requirements in
turn.
3  Knowledge  as  an  Imputed  State  Variable
The previous  section  having warned against  reading  too
much  into  knowledge  level  models, the  current  one will
build  such  a  model based  on a  sequence of  plausible
assumptions  largely  concerned  with  cognitive
ergonomics--of  building  models that  require  as  little
effort  to  develop as  possible.  The starting  point  is
Newell’s notion that  the knowledge  level  originates  in one
agent  attempting  to  model  another,  and  hence  is
essentially  a product of  a social  process.  One  can ask the
question  "why should it  be  valuable  to  model another
agent" and come  to  the  conclusion that  the  human  species
is  characterized by its  social  dependencies, the divisions
of  labor  whereby many of  the  goals  of  one  agent  are
satisfied  through  the  behaviors  of  others.  In  these
circumstances  one  agent  will  model  another  in
instrumental  terms, in terms of its  capabilities to carry out
tasks  that  will  lead to the  modeling  agent’s  goals being
satisfied--and,  vice versa, the  other agent will model  the
first  in a reciprocal  fashion.
Consider  a set of agents, A, and a set of tasks,  T, such that
it  is  possible to decide for each agent, a~ A whether  it  can
carry out a task t~ T. Assume,  without loss  of generality,
that  this  is  a  binary  decision  in  that  performance at
different  levels  is  assumed  to define different  tasks,  and
that  we  can write a o t for the truth value that  agent a can
carry  out task  t.  We  can then  characterize  an agent’s
competence,  C(a),  by the  set  of tasks  which it  can carry
out:
C(a) --  {t  ~ T: a o t} (1)
If  one agent knows C(a) for  another  agent,  a,  then 
knows  its  competence  in  terms of  the  tasks  it  can carry
out  and  can  plan  to  manage its  goals  by allocating
appropriate  tasks to the other agent.
However, keeping track  of  the  competencies of  relevant
agents in  terms of  extensive sets  of tasks  for which they
are  competent  is  inefficient  both in  knowledge  acquisition
and storage  if  there  are  many  dependencies  between tasks
such that  the  capability  to  carry out one task  is  a  good
predictor of the capability  to carry out another. A partial
order of difficulty  on tasks,  >,  may  be defined such that
the  capability  to  carry out a task  of  a given difficulty
indicates  the  capability  to  carry  out  tasks  of  lesser
difficulty in the partial order:
Vt,  u ~ T,t  > u = Va ~ A, a o t  ---> a o u (2)
If,  there  is  a  rich partial  order on tasks  independent  of
agents then it  becomes  reasonable to attempt to  represent
the  partial  order  as  one embedded  in  the  free  lattice
generated  by  some  set,  K,  which  we shall  term
knowledge. Since the  free  lattice  generated by a set  of
cardinality,  n,  has  2n  distinct  members, there  is
potentially  an  exponential  decrease  in  the  amount of
information to acquire  and store  about an agent if  it  is
characterized in terms of  its  set  of knowledge  rather  than
the  set  of  tasks  it  can perform. This decrease  will  be
realized  to  the  extent  that  the  embedding of  the  task
dependencies  in  a  free  lattice  involves  tasks
corresponding  to all  elements  of the lattice.
Thus, we  posit  a set  of knowledge,  K, such that  a task,  t,
is  characterized by the set  of knowledge,  K(t),  required 
carry  it  out,  and  the  order  relation  between tasks
corresponds to subset inclusion of  knowledge:
5OVt,  u ~ T,  t  > u =- K(t)  D K(u) (3)
An agent,  a,  is  characterized  by the  knowledge it
possesses,  K(a),  and this  determines its  competence 
terms of tasks:
C(a)  --  {t  ~ T:  K(a)  K(t)} (4)
The  development  to this  stage parallels  that  of knowledge
spaces  as  defined  by  Falmagne,  Koppen,  Villano,
Doignon  and Johannesen (1990),  and applied  by them 
testing  a  student’s  knowledge. However, the  move  from
an  extensional  specification  in  terms  of  tasks  to  an
extensional  specification  in  terms  of  knowledge is
inadequate to  account for  situations  where the capability
to carry out one task may  indicate  the capability  to  carry
out an infinite  number  of lesser  tasks.  Extensionally, this
involves indexing the lesser  tasks as involving an infinite
set  of  knowledge,  but,  as Newell  (1982) notes it  is  better
represented  by a schema  in  which knowledge  is  generated
from knowledge.
If  x is  a subset of knowledge  then G(x) may  be defined 
the  subset which can be generated from it  subject  to  the
obvious  constraints that:-
--the  original  knowledge  is  retained:
x  C K ~  x  c  G(x) (5)
--all  of the knowledge  that  can be generated is  included:
x  c  K ~  G(G(x))  c  (6)
--additional  knowledge  generates additional  knowledge:
x  c  y  C K ~  G(x)  c  G(y) (7)
Tarski (1930) noted that  the consequence  operator of  any
deductive  system has  these  properties,  and W6jcicki
(1988) has used it  conversely to characterize  any closure
operator satisfying  (5) through (6) as logic.  As Ras iowa
and Sikorski  (1970) remark:
"the  consequence  operation  in  a formalized
theory T should  also be called the logic of ~1 ~
that is,  every generator  defines a formal  logic.
The development  of  this  section  has  arrived  at  a
characterization  of  the  knowledge  level  that  corresponds
to  the folk  psychology  notion that  agents can be modeled
as  possessing  something  termed  knowledge,  and  the
cognitive  science  notion that  the  capability  to generate
knowledge  from  knowledge corresponds  to  a  formal
deductive logic.  What  presuppositions have been involved
in  this  development?
¯ PI:  Agents have a reasonably stable  competence  such
that  it  is  well-defined whether  an agent can carry out
a task.
¯ P2: There  is  a rich order relationship  of difficulty  on
tasks  that  is  reasonably  independent of  particular
agents.
¯ P3:  Knowledge is  not  just  possessed  but  can  be
generated  in  a  principled  fashion  from  other
knowledge.
These are  strong  presuppositions  but ones that  seem to
work reasonably  well  in  characterizing  human  agents--
we  are  acutely  aware of  the  exceptions and treat  them as
anomalies.
What  the  development does  not  do is  characterize  the
nature of knowledge,  other than as  an arbitrary  index set
used in modeling. It  would  be reasonable to  suppose that
our  actual  definitions  of  knowledge elements would be
closely related to our definitions  of,  and terminology  for,
tasks--for  example,  that  someone capable  of  adding
numbers might be said  to  have "knowledge  of  addition."
However, too  close  a  link  to  tasks  would reduce  the
benefits  of  representing  capabilities  through subsets  of
knowledge rather  than  subsets  of  tasks,  and hence we
would expect  an attempt  to  characterize  knowledge  in  a
way that  abstracts  away from tasks  and looks  for  more
general  knowledge elements  that  underlie  a  range  of
tasks.
The following  sections  develop  a  theory  of  the
management  of  agents’  knowledge processes  which gives
further  insights  into  the  properties  of  a  useful
characterization  of  the knowledge  level,  particularly  the
granularity  of  knowledge.
4  Organizational  Knowledge
The previous  section  constrains  knowledge  level  models
to  be  predictive  of  individual  agent’s  performance of
tasks.  However, agents  generally  work together  in
organizations and it  is reasonable to suppose  that a further
constraint  upon such  models is  that  they  should  be
predictive  of  the  aggregate  capabilities  of  agents
operating  in  organizations  and  in  conjunction  with
technological support.
A useful  perspective  from  which  to  examine
organizations  is  a  collective  stance  (Gaines,  1994) 
which humanity is  viewed as  a  single  adaptive  agent
recursively partitioned  in space and time into  sub-systems
that  are similar  to the whole. In  human  terms, these parts
include societies,  organizations, groups, individuals, roles,
and neurological functions (Gaines, 1987).
It  is  reasonable  to  add a  further  constraint  to  the
generative function G, that:-
--  an agent’s knowledge  includes that  of its  components:
a  ~  b  --~  G(K(a))  c  G(K(b))  (8)
51A stronger  constraint  may  be stated  as  a compositional
hypothesis:
¯ P4:  The knowledge  of  a  compound agent  can  be
derived  from the  knowledge  of  its  parts  and their
organization.
In practice,  this  may  be an irrefutable  hypothesis whereby
we  assume  that if  such a derivation is incorrect it  is  due to
inadequate characterization  of  the  agents’  knowledge  or
of  the  way  in  which they are  organized.  For example, if
we put  together  a  team  of  people  with  apparently
adequate knowledge  between them to  perform a  task,  and
they  can not do so,  then we are  likely  to  say that  they
lacked the skills  to work  together or that  the situation  did
not  allow  them to.  That is,  we ascribe  the  failure  of
compositionality to a failure  to have properly modeled  the
knowledge  required  or  to  an inadequate organization.  We
reevaluate  the  knowledge  model  of  the agents rather  than
ascribe  the  problem  to  a failure  of the  compositionality
hypothesis,  thus  making  it  an axiomatic constraint  upon
the  notion of  a complete knowledge  model.
One interesting  possibility  is  to  extend the  notion  of
knowledge to  the  organizational  aspects  of  a  compound
agent by assessing  the  difference  between the  knowledge
of an agent and that  of its  components,  and ascribing this
to its  organization:-
O(a)  =-  G(K(a))  -  U  (9)
x~a
That is,  O(a) is  the  additional  knowledge  resulting  from
the organization of the agents into an organization.
4.1  Impact of  Technology on Knowledge
The measurement  of  the  impact of  organizing  agents  in
equation  (9)  may be  generalized  to  apply  to  any
contextual  variables  that  impact the  capabilities  of  an
agent or  agents. For example, an agent, a,  together with a
book, a  tool,  or computer  support,  may  be regarded as an
enhanced  agent  a’,  and  one  may  measure  the
enhancement  at  the  knowledge  level  as:
E(a,a’)  =- G(K(a’  ))  -  G(K(a)) (10)
That is,  E(a,a’) is  the additional knowledge  resulting from
the  book,  tool,  computer support  or  other  contextual
variables.
This analysis  may  be applied to  give an instrumental view
of the effect  of one agent collaborating with another. For
example, that  when  I  help  you then  I  am an instrument
contributing  to  your  capability.  This  is  the  form of
analysis we  use to explicate the notion of a coach.
One  can derive  a relationship  between equations  (9)  and
(10):
O(a)  =  ~E(x,a) (11)
XEa
That is,  the organizational  knowledge  is  the  union of the
enhancements  that  each  agent  contributes  to  the
organization.
5  Learning
Presupposition  P1 in  Section  3,  that  agents  have
reasonably stable  competence  is  in  contradiction  to  our
expectations  that  agents will  improve their  competence
with experience.  In  particular,  it  is  antithetical  to
Gadamer’s notion  of  an  expert  as  one who learns  from
experience.
To take into  account learning,  one can weaken  P1 to the
presupposition that  agents do not lose  competence:
¯ PI’:  Agents  have  a  monotonically  increasing
competence  such that  if  an agent can carry out a task
it  will always  be able to carry out that task.
and treat  C(a) as  lower bound  on an agent’s  competence.
The knowledge  level  analysis  of  Section  3 then  follows
but with the  set  of  knowledge  characterizing  the  agent’s
state  being a lower bound  on the  agent’s knowledge.
The analysis  of  Section  4 of  the  enhancement brought
about by some supporting  system may  then  be applied  to
the  state  of  the agent:  before support,  with support,  and
after  support.  The after  support enhancement  defines the
learning  brought about by the  experience  of  having the
support.  For example, what tasks  one can perform before
reading a book, while having access to it,  and after  having
read  it.
This analysis  provides a basis  for modeling  various forms
of  knowledge  transfer  mechanisms,  differentiating  them
from knowledge  support  systems (Gaines,  1990). It  also
making it  clear  that  what  at  one  time  was termed
’expertise transfer’  is  better  termed  ’knowledge  transfer’,
and that the ’transfer’  is  not explicit,  but rather  a way  of
describing and agent’s change  of state.
It  is  tempting to  apply knowledge  level  analysis  to  the
learning  capabilities  of  an  agent  through  the
presupposition:-
P5: The capability  of  an agent to  become  competent
to carry out a task can be predicted from its  learning
knowledge.
The notion  of  meta-knowledge  that  is  predictive  of  an
agent’s  capabilities  to  acquire  knowledge  is  consistent
with the educational literature  on study skills  and learning
to  learn  (Novak  and  Gowin,  1984;  Borenstein  and
Radman,  1985).  However, a  knowledge  level  analysis  of
learning is  incomplete in that  it  cannot account for many
of  the  phenomena  of  learning  and training  such as  the
probabilistic  nature  of trial  and error  learning  and the
management  of  training  through  performance feedback
with  no model of  an  agent’s  exact  knowledge state
(Gaines, 1972a,b).
525.1  Uncertainty at  the Knowledge  Level
There is  a fundamental  uncertainty at  the  knowledge  level
in  distinguishing  between phenomena  ascribable  to  the
incompleteness  of  a  model  of  an  agent  and  those
ascribable to the agent’s learning.  If  the agent is  in the
situation  of undertaking a  new  task  and proves capable of
performing  it  then we  can ascribe this  either  to the agent’s
existing  knowledge  that  had not  been modeled or  to  the
agent  having  acquired  the  knowledge in  attempting  to
perform  the task.
As already  noted,  similar  considerations  apply  to
predictions  of the  capabilities  of a  team from models  of
the  knowledge of  the  agents  forming the  team.  A full
treatment of  the knowledge  level  has to  take into  account
that  the modeling  is subject to intrinsic  uncertainties and
that  the  modeled system  is  subject  to  change  with
experience.
This  uncertainty  leads  to  a  knowledge  management
perspective whereby  the  capabilities  of  an agent,  such as
an organization,  must be managed  as  part  of the  modeling
process.  Knowledge  modeling is  an  active  process  of
creating  a model through action  as  much  as  it  is  one of
fitting  a model  through observation.
The practical  question  then  becomes one of  how good a
model needs to  be for  effective  management.  That is,  we
are  not  concerned with completeness of  models but only
their  adequacy for  particular  purposes.  For example, a
related  article  shows  that  the optimization of learning to
accelerate  a sigmoidal learning  curve to  become  a  linear
one can be managed  with surprisingly  weak  models of  the
knowledge  states  of the  agents involved (Gaines, 1996).
6  Conclusions
An operational  definition  of  knowledge  has  been
developed  through  a  knowledge level  analysis  of  the
emergence of  the  knowledge  construct  through modeling
and management  processes in  societies  of adaptive agents.
The analysis  shows how knowledge becomes ascribed  to
agents,  organizations  and technologies,  and how  formal
logics  of  knowledge, organizations  and technologies
emerge naturally  from reasonable presuppositions  in the
modeling  process.
Intrinsic  uncertainties  in  our models  and the capabilities
of agents to  learn  imply that  knowledge  modeling  has  to
be an  active  process  of  knowledge management.  We  are
as  much creating  a  model through  action  as  fitting  a
model  through observation.
What  has happened  in  recent  years is  the  recognition that
processes  of  organizational  management, including
personnel  selection  and placement, career  development,
team building,  and so on,  may all  be subsumed  within  a
single  framework by knowledge level  analysis  of  the
organization as an agent with certain capabilities.
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The analysis  of  organization as  agents requires  existing
knowledge level  theories  to  be  extended  to  take  into
account  the  relations  between an agent  and its  parts,
including other agents and technologies.  It  also  requires
the  theories  to  be extended  to  take  into  account  the
uncertainties  in  models  and the  learning  capabilities  of
agents.  This article  provides  a preliminary  account of
such  extensions  as  a  first  step  towards  principled
foundations  for  knowledge management.
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